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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment presents a review of the developments leading up to
the joint decision by the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the "SEC"), the Ontario Securities Commission (the "OSC")
and the Commission des valeurs mobilieres du Quebec (the "CVMQ")
on July 26, 1989 to propose in a recent release1 a multijurisdictional
disclosure system to regulate the disclosure requirements of qualifying
United States and Canadian securities issuers. The new proposed mul-
tijurisdictional system is, in the words of the SEC, "a hybrid between
the reciprocal approach and the common prospectus approach"2 to fa-
cilitating simultaneous multijurisdictional offerings of securities, peri-
odic disclosure and other reporting currently required.
This comment will also discuss certain major aspects of the pro-
posed system. Additionally, after a review of some of the comment let-
ters the SEC has received, the proposed system will then be analyzed to
determine whether the proposed system adequately meets the goals of
securities regulation in the areas reviewed.
II. OVERVIEW
In recent years the SEC has noted the trend towards the globaliza-
tion of international securities markets.3 Since the adoption of Form
20-F in 19791, the SEC has continued to respond to this trend.5 With
1. Multijurisdictional Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6841, Exchange Act
Release No. 27055, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2217, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,432 at 80,281 (July 24, 1989) [hereinafter "The Re-
lease"]. A short explanation about the three commissions involved is perhaps war-
ranted. The SEC is the primary regulatory body in the United States for the securities
industry and regulates on a federal level. Each state exercises concurrent jurisdiction
with the SEC but state securities statutes (collectively known as "Blue Sky" laws)
provide only secondary regulation. In Canada the opposite is true. The primary regula-
tory bodies are the provincial securities commissions with only some secondary regula-
tion occurring at the federal level. However, over 92% of the value of securities traded
in Canada are subject to the jurisdiction of either the OSC or the CVMQ due to the
location of the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges within their jurisdictions. I will
refer to the provincial securities regulations of the OSC and CVMQ as Canadian Se-
curities regulation. For a more detailed explanation, see id. at 80,289-290.
2. Id. at 80,282.
3. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No.
6568, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,743 at 87,318 (Feb.
28, 1985), [hereinafter "The 1985 Release"].
4. Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issuers, Ex-
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the new multijurisdictional disclosure system proposed, the SEC has
indicated it intends to take its first step toward integrated regulation of
the United States - Canadian securities market, with possible expan-
sion in the future to additional jurisdictions.'
A. International Developments
There has been a tremendous growth in recent times of both the
size and number of new foreign issues of securities in the United States
and in the number" and volume8 of foreign securities traded in the
United States as the financial markets have become increasingly inte-
grated across national borders.9 The single largest source of such in-
vestment activity in the United States is Canada. 10
The above-mentioned integration has not been a one way street.
Foreign investors have had an even greater proclivity toward investing
in the securities of United States corporations." Again, the single larg-
change Act Release No. 16371 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 82,363 at 82,547 (November 29, 1979) and Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 240.220f (1979)
were adopted as an integrated registration statement and annual reporting form for use
by foreign private issuers.
5. The 1985 Release, supra note 3, at 87,318.
6. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,281.
7. There are 150 foreign securities traded on U.S. stock exchanges and 291 are
quoted on NASDAQ. Including all the foreign securities traded over-the-counter, there
are over 2,000 foreign issues traded in the United States. The Release, supra note 1, at
80,284.
8. . Gross transactions by United States investors in foreign corporate stocks ex-
ceeded $151 billion in 1988, an almost 900% increase since 1980. Gross transactions
by United States investors in foreign debt securities exceeded $445 billion in 1988, a
1200% increase since 1980. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,284.
9. See SIMONDS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS LAW: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, (1989); WORLD ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND
PROSPECTS, (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., April 1989) [hereinaf-
ter "International Monetary Fund"].
10. Canadian issuers accounted for 124 public offerings in 1987 and 1988 aggre-
gating $10 billion, of which over $8 billion consisted of equity or convertible debt.
Additionally, over $1.7 billion in Canadian debt has been registered in the last three
years, pursuant to the SEC's shelf registration process under Rule 415. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 330.415 (1983). More than half of the 516 foreign issuers that file periodic reports
with the SEC are Canadian. As of June 30, 1989, there were 21 Canadian issuers
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 38 on the American Stock Exchange and 146
quoted on NASDAQ. See The Release, supra note 1, at 80,285. Compare with the
figures in note 7, supra.
11. See, Gira, Toward a Global Capital Market:the Emergence of Simultaneous
Multinational Securities Offerings, I I MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 157, 163 (1987).
46 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
est source of such investment in the securities of United States corpora-
tions by the investors of a foreign country has been from Canada. 2 The
United States and Canada are the world's largest bilateral trading
partners 3 and, next to the European Community, represent the most
significant geographic integration of financial services markets. 4
Simultaneous multinational issues of securities, one of the trends
that the SEC, OSC and CVMQ hope to address in the proposed regu-
lations 5 present, perhaps, the most clear evidence that globalization is
real. In 1983, Alcan Aluminum and Bell Canada, both Canadian com-
panies, each simultaneously offered equity issues in the United States,
Canada and Japan.'6 In 1984, British Telecommunications offered 2.5
billion shares of common stock in a privatization simultaneously in the
United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and the United States.17 In 1986,
British Gas PLC conducted a similar offering of 4 billion shares while
in 1987, British Airways PLC offered 720 million shares simultane-
ously in those four countries and Switzerland. 8 In 1988, the British
Steel PLC privatization offered 2 billion shares simultaneously in the
United States, Canada, Japan and throughout western Europe and
Hong Kong Telecommunications Limited offered 877 million shares si-
multaneously in the United States, Hong Kong and elsewhere.' 9 This is
just the beginning, however, and simultaneous multinational issues
should be even more popular in the future.2"
This globalization of the world's securities markets has not oc-
curred without good reason. Exchange rate fluctuations, high interest
rates, technological progress in the securities markets and deregulation
have all contributed toward the globalization trend.2' This trend has
produced substantial benefits for securities issuers, borrowers, savers,
investors and bankers22, and it is unlikely that this trend will reverse.2"
12. See, International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 51. At the end of 1987,
there were 50 U.S. security dealers registered with the OSC. Additionally, there is a
large volume of offshore activity. Id.
13. Id. at 50.
14. Id.
15. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,282.
16. The 1985 Release, supra note 3, at 87,320.
17. Id.
18. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,284 n.16.
19. Id.
20. Debs, The Development of International Equity Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L L. J.
5, 9 (1986) [hereinafter "Debs, Development"].
21. Id.
22. Debs, Globalization of Financial Markets: What is Happening and Why?, 15
INT'L Bus. LAW 198, 201 (1987) [hereinafter "Debs, Globalization"].
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There is, however, a downside. With increased international linkage
comes increased risk due to the greater consequences of a single
failure.24
The constraints on further globalization have been summarized by
Richard Debs25:
The constraints on further globalization will not be market con-
straints. They are not questions of supply and demand for the ser-
vices. The demand is there and the financial institutions are eager
to meet the demand. The constraints on further globalization relate
to infrastructure. The financial infrastructure of the global financial
system is based on domestic systems - domestic systems of law, of
regulation and supervision, of accounting rules, of clearing and set-
tlement, of stock exchanges, etc. Most of these systems, which to-
gether constitute the basic institutional framework of the global
markets, are still predominantly based on national market prac-
tices, and are as yet not adequately geared to the global
markets.26
Properly handling those constraints will not be easy because there is no
worldwide regulatory authority and any efforts to harmonize regulation
will require political and economic compromise.17
1. Effect of European Community Actions
Efforts parallel to the United States - Canadian multijurisdictional
disclosure system are already underway to integrate securities regula-
tion in the European Community.28 The European Community efforts
can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome2 . By 1992, mutual recogni-
tion of prospectuses meeting minimum common requirements is ex-
23. Debs, Development, supra note 20, at 9.
24. Debs, Globalization, supra note 22, at 201.
25. In 1986, Richard Debs served as the President of Morgan Stanley Interna-
tional, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Development of
the United States Chamber of Commerce, and was a member of many other commit-
tees and councils concerned with international economics. Debs, Development, supra
note 20, at 5.
26. Id. at 201.
27. Karmel, Can Regulators of International Capital Markets Strike a Balance
Between Competing Interests?, 4 B.U. INT'L L. J. 105, 106 (1986).
28. See International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 52-55.
29. 2 ALAN CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW, 2-4 (1969) (Annotated Treaty
of Rome, arts. 1 to 3).
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pected throughout the European Community."0 The inclusion of only
Canada in the current negotiations thus gives the SEC the advantage
of a "wait and see" position with respect to the events occurring in the
European Community. 3'
2. The Basle Agreement
In July, 1988 the "Group of Ten"32 finally agreed upon a plan,
entitled the Basle Agreement, to harmonize regulations in the banking
industry.13 This gradual integration of the banking industry has en-
couraged multilateral efforts to coordinate regulatory policies in other
areas, including securities regulation 4 which has lagged considerably
behind banking regulation."6
3. International Organization of Securities Commissions Efforts
The October 1987 stock market crash spurred on new efforts by
the International Organization of Securities Commissions to coordinate
the regulation of the securities markets.3 6 This organization has real-
ized that striking the right balance between regulatory objectives - fos-
tering competition and protecting investors" - becomes an increasingly
complex task as the international linkages deepen.38
The result of this organization's efforts have been attempts to es-
tablish more effective policy coordination. 9 Securities regulators have
realized, however, that the efficient and safe operation of the national
and international securities markets can no longer be assured without
30. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 54.
31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32. The "Group of Ten", oddly enough, contains twelve members: Belgium, Can-
ada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. International
Monetary Fund, supra note 9 at 55 n.25.
33. Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, International
Convergence of Capital Standards (July, 1988).
34. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9 at 58.
35. Id. at 60.
36. Id. at 15, 73.
37. Id. at 7.
38. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 15.
39. See, e.g., Committee on Financial Markets, Minimum Disclosure Rules Ap-
plicable to All Publically Offered Securities, Paris (1976). According to SEC Chair-
man David Ruder, 1OSCO has also been preparing a report on international securities
offerings that could guide further multijurisdictional disclosure efforts. Ruder Says Un-
released IOSCO Report Could Be Blueprint for Global Offerings, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
1438 (BNA Sept. 22, 1989).
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more effective and comprehensive policy coordination amongst the
nations.40
B. United States - Canadian Efforts: The Free Trade Agreement
While efforts have been underway in the European Community,
serious efforts between the SEC, OSC and CVMQ have been underway
since 1985 when the SEC released a request for comments entitled
"Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings".' Then, in 1987,
The Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement 42 provided addi-
tional incentive to coordinate and harmonize United States and Cana-
dian securities regulation as it heightened awareness of the differences
in Canadian and United States securities regulation.43
The FTA also removed barriers to trade in the financial services
and lifted many restraints on United States and Canadian financial in-
stitutions."" Thus, the FTA is a response to and is expected to help
continue the trend towards increased cross-border financial services
activity.4 5
III. THE SEC's REQUEST FOR COMMENTS IN 1985
Against this background of activity, the SEC initially researched
the possibility of a multijurisdictional disclosure system when the SEC
published a request for comments on February 28, 1985.46 The system
then proposed would have included the United States, Canada and the
40. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 59.
41. The 1985 Release, supra note 3, at 87,318. See infra notes 46-48 and accom-
panying text.
42. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, United States - Canada, 27 I.L.M. 293
(1988) (hereinafter the "FTA"].
43. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 52.
44. Id. at 8. See generally, GOLD AND LEYTON-BROWN, TRADE-OFFS ON FREE
TRADE, 321-45 (1988).
45. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at 51.
46. See The 1985 Release, supra note 3. For an in-depth analysis of the 1985
Release and the responses the SEC received see Gira, supra note 11, 171-76; Cox,
Internationalization of the Capital Markets: The Experience of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 201, 204-207 (1987); Note, SEC
Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure Requirements
in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 457
(1987)[hereinafter "Note"]; Spencer, Jr., The Reaction of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Three Con-
cept Releases, 4 B.U. INT'L L. J. 111 (1986); Lorenz, EEC Law and Other Problems
in Applying the SEC Proposal on Multinational Offerings to the U.K., 21 INT'L LAW
795 (1987).
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United Kingdom and would facilitate simultaneous multinational se-
curities offerings under either a reciprocal approach or a common pro-
spectus approach. 47
The common prospectus approach would necessitate all three
countries agreeing on the disclosure standards for an offering document
that would be acceptable to all three jurisdictions. 48 The advantages of
such an approach are that it would harmonize disclosure requirements,
provide greater comparability of financial information from issuers
from different countries and would expedite the development of a uni-
form international database suitable for use by the secondary mar-
kets. 49 Unfortunately, the disadvantage of the common prospectus ap-
proach is its impracticability.5"
Under a reciprocal approach, however, each country would accept
the prospectuses of issuers from the other countries as long as mini-
mum standards were met.51 Thus, only the home country would review
the prospectus.52 The advantages of the reciprocal approach are its ease
of implementation and the time and expense it would save issuers.5"
The disadvantages to the reciprocal approach are that it eliminates in-
centives to harmonize disclosure standards, compromises the compara-
bility of financial information and does not expedite the creation of a
suitable database for the secondary market.54
The responses to the SEC's 1985 Release were overwhelmingly in
favor of the reciprocal approach because of its practicality, but several
commentators suggested modification of the reciprocal approach. 55
While many commentators realized the inclusion of the United King-
dom in a multijurisdictional disclosure system creates additional obsta-
cles to clear, 56 very few commentators suggested scraping the whole
idea.57 Commentators from jurisdictions not included welcomed the
47. The 1985 Release, supra note 3, at 87,318.
48. Id. at 87,322.
49. Id. at 87,323.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 87,322.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 87,323.
54. Id.
55. Gira, supra note 11, at 174-76.
56. See infra notes 69 - 71 and accompanying text.
57. Gira, supra note 11, at 175. Of all of the law review articles I have come
across, only one comment suggested scrapping the whole idea. See Note, supra note 46.
However, the primary reason given was that the author thought the differences be-
tween disclosure standards in the United States and the United Kingdom were too
great.
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SEC's reciprocal approach and remarked that they would like to see
such efforts extended to their countries. 8
After reviewing the responses received, the SEC began discussions
with the OSC and the CVMQ.5 9 These discussions resulted in a 1988
Memorandum of Understanding between the three commissions which
is the foundation for the currently proposed multijurisdictional disclo-
sure system.6 0
IV. GOALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
Any multijurisdictional disclosure system must adequately meet
the divergent goals of securities regulation. The SEC's two primary se-
curities regulation goals are to foster competition and to protect United
States investors. 61 The fostering competition goal seeks to minimize re-
straints and entry barriers to foreign issuers by removing unnecessary
impediments to transnational capital formation without unduly dis-
advantaging United States issuers.62
The investor protection goal seeks to ensure that United States in-
vestors have sufficient disclosure of comparable, consistent, reliable and
relevant financial information to make an informed investment deci-
sion.6" The SEC hopes that the proposed multijurisdictional disclosure
system can meet these two goals.
State Blue Sky laws also attempt to protect investors within their
states. As of 1985, 34 states had "fair, just and equitable" statutes
which regulate the offer and sale of securities based on the merit of the
investment and the quality of the issuer whereas the remaining 16
states have "full disclosure" statutes which, like the SEC's regulations,
allow any securities to be offered as long as adequate disclosure is
made.64 These Blue Sky laws will not be changed by the proposed mul-
tijurisdictional disclosure system.65
58. Gira, supra note 11, at 175.
59. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,282.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The 1985 Release, supra note 3, at 87,323 n.26.
65. Any further explanation of state Blue Sky laws is beyond the scope of this
comment. For an analysis of the efficacy of state Blue Sky laws and merit regulation in
an international securities market see Note, State Securities Regulation: Merit Review
of Foreign Equity Offerings, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 939 (1985). Some Blue Sky regulators
such as the North American Securities Administrators Association and the Idaho Fi-
nance Department, however, have already endorsed the SEC's proposed multijurisdic-
tional disclosure standards. State Developments: Regulatory Briefs, Sec. Reg. & L.
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Canadian regulatory goals are remarkably similar to those found
in the United States. Canada has also sought to protect investors
through the mechanism of full and fair disclosure of financial informa-
tion to investors so that investors may make an informed investment
decision while at the same time maintaining fairness and equality. 6
Thus, both the United States and Canada have historically relied on a
refined and well developed system of disclosure as the principal protec-
tion for investors. 67
V. WHY CANADA?
Canada is a logical first step for the SEC to take. Not only are
Canadian securities regulations comparable in many ways to those of
the SEC, Canada is also the largest source of foreign securities in the
United States.
68
Many of the obstacles that would have to be overcome with a sys-
tem including the United Kingdom do not present a problem with a
system limited to the United States and Canada. The methods of offer-
ing, underwriting, registering and marketing securities in the United
Kingdom differ substantially from those in the United States and Can-
ada.69 Also, disclosure, accounting and auditing standards vary consid-
erably more between the United Kingdom and the United States than
they do between Canada and the United States.70 Finally, a recent
English court decision could potentially hamper SEC insider trading
investigations.7 1
Rep. 21 (BNA Jan. 5, 1990).
66. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,282; 80,289.
67. Id. at 80,282.
68. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
69. The 1985 Release, supra note 3, at 87,321. In the United Kingdom, a defini-
tive prospectus which cannot be subsequently amended is filed generally two weeks
before the price setting date. Only after the price setting date or "impact date" can
prospectuses be circulated and offers solicited. By contrast, in the United States and
Canada, preliminary prospectuses, which are subject to subsequent amendment, can be
circulated before the effective date during the waiting period to solicit offers. Id.
70. For a detailed analysis of the differences between the United Kingdom and the
United States, see Gira, supra note 11 at 164-170; Note, supra note 46; Lorenz, supra
note 46.
71. In re an Inquiry Under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985,
slip. op. (Ch. Mar. 31, 1987). [hereinafter the "Warner decision"]. In the Warner
decision, an English court ruled that journalists may withhold their sources of informa-
tion predicting the results of government reviews of takeover bids from government
inspectors. The Warner decision may thus hamper SEC requests for information under
the Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the SEC,
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One commentator from the United Kingdom strongly supported
the SEC's efforts and stated that it understood why Canada was chosen
as the first logical partner but also expressed its hope that the United
Kingdom will be chosen as the next participant at the earliest possible
opportunity.7" Another commentator hoped to see the system extended
to Europe and Japan.73 For now, however, the proposed system is lim-
ited to the United States and Canada.
A. The Registration Process
Both Canada and the United States have a waiting period after
the filing of a prospectus and before the effective date during which the
disclosure documents are reviewed by the regulatory authorities."'
While the SEC focuses exclusively on the adequacy of disclosure, the
OSC and CVMQ also evaluate the merit of the offering.7" Thus, the
OSC and CVMQ individually perform a review process comparable to
the combined review process undertaken by the SEC and some of the
state Blue Sky commissioners.
During the waiting period in Canada, as in the United States, se-
curities may be offered, but not sold, while only limited types of infor-
mation may be disseminated to generate interest in the prospective of-
fering.76 Canadian underwriting and marketing practices are also
similar to those employed in the United States. 7
Prospectuses in Canada and the United States have many similar
common required elements. Some of the major items requiring a
description and discussion in both countries are the issuer's capital
structure, property and business, development of business, acquisitions
CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters Relat-
ing to Securities and Futures [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. C. Rep. (CCH) $
84,027, at 88,244 (Sept. 23, 1986). For a more detailed analysis of the Warner deci-
sion, see Note, The British-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding of 1986: Implications
After Warner, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 110 (1987).
72. Letter from Barclays Bank PLC to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC
(September 26, 1989) [hereinafter the "Barclays Letter"]. The hopes of Barclays Bank
PLC will likely be realized. The United Kingdom has already been identified by Sara
Hanks, former Chief of the SEC's Office of International Finance, as the next candi-
date. Hanks Cites SEC's "Practical Stance" on International Securities Issues, Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. 103 (BNA Jan. 19, 1990).
73. Letter from Sullivan and Cromwell to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the
SEC at 3 (October 31, 1989) (hereinafter th'e "Sullivan Letter"1.
74. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,290-291.
75. Id. at 80,291.
76. Id. at 80,291 n.67.
77. Id. at 80,292.
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and operating results, officer and director compensation, officer and di-
rector indebtedness to the issuer, and interests in material transac-
tions. 78 Also required in both countries is a description and discussion
of the securities offered, use of the proceeds, underwriter's obligations,
plan of distribution, distribution spread, and material risks and risk
factors.79 Finally, prospectuses in both countries require audited finan-
cial statements for the past five years, an auditor's report, and various
resolutions or certifications by the officers and directors of the issuer
approving the prospectus.8
The OSC and CVMQ have both adopted the use of a short form
prospectus in their Prompt Offering Qualification system. 81 Like the
SEC's Forms S-3 and F-3, this short form prospectus also contains vir-
tually all of the information contained in a long form prospectus by
incorporating by reference other documents filed with the regulatory
body.82
Like the SEC's Rule 41583 shelf registration process, the CVMQ
also has a shelf registration process available. 8 Both shelf registration
processes are designed to allow the frequent issuer of securities easier
and quicker access to the market over a maximum one year period of
distribution. 5 The OSC has not yet, however, adopted a shelf registra-
tion process.
B. Periodic Reporting Requirements
As in the United States, once a company registers securities in
Canada, it becomes subject to periodic reporting requirements.8" These
78. Id. at 80,291.
79. Id. at 80,291-292.
80. Id. at 80,292. For a more detailed analysis of the comparability of United
States and Canadian prospectus requirements, see generally Connelly, Multinational
Securities Offerings: A Canadian Perspective, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 258
(1987).
81. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,292.
82. Id. Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. 239.13 (1987) and Form F-3, 17 C.F.R. 239.33
(1987) are abbreviated registration forms for certain qualifying domestic (S-3) and
foreign (F-3) issuers for certain transactions.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1983).
84. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,293.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 80,293. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a
(1933), 77b - c (1987), 77d (1980), 77e (1954), 77f (1987), 77g (1933), 77h (1940),
77i (1987), 77j (1954), 77k (1934), 771 (1954), 77m (1934), 77n (1933), 77o (1934),
7 7 p (1933), 77q (1954), 77r (1933), 77s - t (1987), 77u (1933), 77v (1987), 77w
(1933), 77x (1975), 77y - aa (1933) governs the registration process in the United
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periodic reporting requirements are also similar. Like United States re-
porting companies, Canadian reporting companies must file audited an-
nual financial statements,8" unaudited quarterly financial statements,88
and reports of any material changes in the company. Additionally,
Canadian reporting companies are subject to proxy regulation as are
United States reporting companies.9 0
C. Auditing and Accounting
Although auditing standards in Canada differ in some aspects
from those in the United States, generally accepted practice in Canada
routinely encompasses all significant auditing procedures required in
the United States.91 The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
("CICA") periodically reviews new auditing standards adopted by its
United States counterpart, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA").92
AICPA standards require the inclusion of an explanatory para-
graph in an auditor's report if there are substantial doubts about the
entity's continued existence as a going concern9" or if other material
uncertainties exist.9 ' Canadian standards prohibit such a paragraph if
States. All companies that register securities for sale in the United States pursuant to
this act automatically become reporting companies for purposes of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b - c (1987), 77d (1980), 77e (1954), 77j
(1954), 77k (1934), 77m (1934), 77o (1934), 77s (1987), 78a - c (1988), 78d - d2
(1987), 78e (1934), 78f (1987), 78g (1984), 78h (1989), 78i (1982), 78j (1934), 78k
(1984), 78k-1 - 1 (1987), 78m (1988), 78n (1985), 78o (1987), 78o-3 (1986), 7 8 p
(1964), 78q - q-i (1987), 78r (1936), 78s (1975), 78t - t-1 (1987), 78u - u-I (1988),
78v (1934), 78w (1987), 78x (1975), 78y (1986), 78z (1935), 78aa - bb (1987), 78cc
(1938), 78dd (1934), 78dd-1 - dd-2 (1988), 78ee (1975), 78ff (1988), 78gg - hh
(1934), which regulates periodic reporting requirements.
87. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,293. Annual reports including audited finan-
cial statements are required by reporting companies in the United States by either
Form 10-k, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1989) or Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1989).
88. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,293. Unaudited quarterly financial state-
ments are required on Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1989) for United States
reporting companies.
89. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,293. Material changes in the business, opera-
tions or capital of the issuer are required to be reported on Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. §
249.308 (1977) for United States reporting companies.
90. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,293.
91. Id. at 80,293-294.
92. Id. at 80,294.
93. See AICPA Statement of Auditing Standards [hereinafter "SAS"] No. 59.
94. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,294.
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there is adequate disclosure in a note to the financial statements. 95 But
is this really a difference? In substance it is not. Under either standard
the same result is achieved: the doubts or uncertainties are disclosed to
the readers of the financial statements.
This difference in form, however, may also be soon ameliorated.
The CICA has recently published guidelines encouraging Canadian au-
ditors to add comments for United States readers that explain the vari-
ation in reporting standards and cross-reference to the adequate disclo-
sure whenever the auditor's report is included in a document to be filed
with the SEC.96 The proposed multijurisdictional system would require
such explanation. 97
Thus, significant differences between Canadian and United States
auditing standards do not exist. Under either set of standards, investors
are given sufficient disclosure to make informed investment decisions.
There are differences between the ethical and independence standards
promulgated by the CICA and the AICPA, 98 but these differences gen-
erally have no effect on an audit performed in a competent, profes-
sional manner.
United States generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP")
are similar in many respects to Canadian GAAP, but there are some
differences. 99 Canadian GAAP require the purchase method of ac-
counting' for most business combinations that would be accounted for
by the pooling-of-interests method under United States GAAP.0 1
United States GAAP require the expending of certain development
costs'012 that may be capitalized under Canadian GAAP.10 3 United
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See CICA Handbook § 1580. The purchase method of accounting for busi-
ness combinations is used in both the United States and in Canada. Under this method,
the acquired assets are revaluated to their fair market value in the acquiror's financial
statements. Any excess of purchase price over the fair market value of the net assets
acquired is generally attributed to goodwill, a long term asset.
101. AICPA Statement of Financial Accounting Standards [hereinafter "SFAS"]
No. 16. Under the pooling-of-interests method of accounting for business combinations,
the acquired assets are included in the financial statements of the acquiror at the values
previously stated in the acquired company's financial statements. Thus, under this
method, there is no revaluation of assets to fair market value and no recognition of
goodwill.
102. SFAS No. 2.
103. CICA Handbook § 3450. The capitalized development costs would then be
expended generally over their expected useful life within certain maximum lifespans
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States GAAP require current recognition of foreign currency gains and
losses10 4 in some cases where Canadian GAAP allow deferral. 10 5
There are differences in pension accounting measurement meth-
ods'01 and, under United States GAAP but not Canadian GAAP, an
expense must be recognized in certain situations under an employee
stock compensation plan when the stock options are granted. 07 Cana-
dian GAAP follow the income statement approach to accounting for
income taxes. 10 8 United States GAAP previously followed the income
statement approach but recently switched to the balance sheet
approach." 9
Canadian GAAP do not consider the effect of common stock
equivalents on earnings per share,"0 whereas United States GAAP re-
quire reporting earnings per share both on a primary basis (the same as
Canadian GAAP - without the effect of common stock equivalents) and
on a fully diluted basis (with the effect of dilutive common stock
equivalents)."' Also affecting earnings per share information, United
States GAAP define extraordinary items more restrictively."' Cana-
dian GAAP do not require the consolidation of nonhomogeneous sub-
sidiaries,"' whereas United States GAAP do." 4
Finally, differences may be significant in certain heavily regulated
industries, such as insurance or banking." 6 In these types of industries,
through the process of amortization.
104. SFAS No. 52.
105. CICA Handbook § 1650.
106. Compare CICA Handbook § 3460 with SFAS No. 87.
107. Accounting Principles Board Opinion [hereinafter "APB"] No. 25.
108. CICA Handbook §§ 3470 to 3471.
109. SFAS No. 96, which superceded APB No. 11. Deferred taxes arise from
timing differences between the recognition of income for tax purposes and the recogni-
tion of income for financial statement purposes. Typically, one of the largest timing
differences giving rise to deferred taxes results from the allowed use of accelerated
depreciation for tax purposes while straight line depreciation is used for financial state-
ment purposes. Such a timing difference can be significant in a capital intensive indus-
try. The balance sheet approach (currently in vogue in the United States) accounts for
deferred taxes using currently existing tax rates, regardless of when the timing differ-
ence originated. The income statement approach (previously in vogue in the United
States and currently followed in Canada) accounts for deferred taxes using the tax
rates that existed when the timing difference originated.
110. CICA Handbook § 3500.
111. APB No. 15.
112. Compare CICA Handbook § 3480 with APB No. 30.
113. CICA Handbook § 1600.
114. SFAS No. 94.
115. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,294.
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specialized accounting practices may have developed.116
D. Other Similarities and Differences
Canada's federal and provincial takeover laws impose on incumbent
management and third-party bidders detailed disclosure requirements
that closely resemble those required by the Williams Act 1 7 under
schedule 14D-1,118 the United States federal takeover law. Also, the
substantive protections of Canadian law are similar to the Williams
Act. Both provide for acceptance of tendered shares on a pro rata ba-
sis 1 9 and minimum time periods that the tender offer must be open. 2 °
Also, generally all holders of the same class of security must be offered
the same consideration. 21
There are some differences between Canadian takeover law and its
United States counterpart, however. Under Canadian law, when a vari-
ation in the terms of the tender offer increases the value of the consid-
eration offered, all shareholders must receive such increase. 2 2 A final
difference between Canadian and United States takeover law is that
the Williams Act prohibits the purchase by the bidder of the target
shares by any means other than the tender offer while the tender offer
is open, whereas Canadian law allows a bidder to purchase up to 5
percent of the target shares by other means while the tender offer is
open.
123
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 781(i) (1987), 78m(d) - (e) (1988), 78n(d) -(f) (1985).
118. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,295 and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1986).
Various states have case law and statutes governing takeovers. They govern anything
from the required duties of care of incumbent officers and directors to addressing the
extent to which the successful acquiror can sell off the acquired assets. Such state laws
are beyond the scope of this comment.
119. Compare Canadian Business Corporations Act [hereinafter "CBCA"] §
196(1)(c), Ontario Securities Act [hereinafter "OSC"] § 94(7), and Quebec Securities
Act [hereinafter "QSC"] with the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n(d)(6) (1985).
120. Compare CBCA § 197(b), OSA §§ 94(2), 97(5), and QSA §§ 147.3, 147.8
(21 calendar-day minimum offering period) with Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
l(a) (1986)(20 business-day minimum offering period).
121. Compare CBCA § 197(d), OSA § 96 and QSA §§ 145 to 146 with Rule
14d-10(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1986) and 13e-4(f)(8)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §
240.13e-4(f)(8)(ii) (1986).
122. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,296 n.133.
123. See Letter from Cohen Swados Wright Hanifin Bradford & Brett to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC at 2 (October 25, 1989) [hereinafter the
"Cohen Letter"]. See also Letter from the American Bar Association to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the SEC at 6 (November 10, 1989) [hereinafter the "ABA Let-
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VI. PROBLEMS IN ANY MULTI JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
Any multijurisdictional disclosure system must not only ade-
quately meet each jurisdiction's securities regulation goals, as previ-
ously discussed, but should also harmonize disclosure standards as
much as possible while still reducing the costs inherent in complying
with multijurisdictional disclosure standards.124 A minimum of harmo-
nization of disclosure standards is necessary to provide potential inves-
tors in each jurisdiction with the minimum of information they need to
make an informed investment decision by ensuring sufficient compara-
bility of information when making an investment choice between a
home country investment and a foreign investment."l 5
On the other hand, for a multijurisdictional system to have any
value, it must reduce the costs inherent in complying with differing but
often duplicative disclosure requirements. The latter is accomplished
through a mutual recognition approach.12
Finally, member countries must effectively enforce their securities
laws throughout the multiple jurisdictions when applicable. 2 ' Such ef-
fective enforcement requires comprehensive cooperation and enforce-
ment assistance among the regulatory bodies.12 Memoranda of Under-
standing are already in place between OSC, CVMQ and the SEC.129
VII. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
The proposed system would permit certain Canadian issuers to
register securities and meet periodic disclosure requirements in the
United States using Canadian disclosure documents. 30 The system
would also allow certain Canadian tender offers to be made in compli-
ance with Canadian tender offer regulation.'
As proposed, the system would allow Canadian issuers subject to
United States proxy regulation to use Canadian documents for certain
proxy solicitations"3 2 and certain rights and exchange offers. 133 Finally,
ter"]; Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 24.
124. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,288.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 80,288-289.
127. Id. at 80,289.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 80,289; n.54.
130. Id. at 80,281.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 80,297.
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Canadian companies subject to the insider reporting requirements of
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 34 could fulfill these require-
ments using Canadian forms." 5 Comparable reciprocal treatment
would be given to United States issuers in Canada.'36
Canadian issuers generally must have at least a three year report-
ing history with either the OSC or CVMQ and meet minimum market
value and public float tests to participate. 3 7 The public float and mar-
ket value tests may be varied depending on the type of security is-
sued. 13 8 All Canadian issuers would still be subject to United States
civil liability and anti-fraud provisions. 3 9 Finally, all Canadian pro-
spectuses filed with the SEC would have a wraparound form giving the
name and address of the company's resident agent in the United States
and containing appropriate warnings. 10
A. Registration of Offerings
The system would distinguish between offerings of investment
grade debt or preferred stock and other offerings. The distinction has
been made because much less disclosure is required for an investor to
make an informed investment decision about the former as opposed to
the latter type of investment.""
1. Investment Grade Debt and Preferred Stock
Debt and preferred stock offerings that are non-convertible for at
least one year would be considered investment grade if the securities
had a rating signifying such by at least one of the nationally recognized
statistical securities rating services in the United States." 2 Proposed
134. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (1964).
135. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,281.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 80,298.
138. Id. at 80,303.
139. Id. at 80,301 n.155. See also the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77k (1934); 771 (1954); 77o (1934) and the Security and Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78o (1987); 78r (1936); 78t (1987) and the Securities and Exchange Act,
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 (1987); .13e-4 (1986); .14e-3 (1980).
140. Id. at 80,301. Such warnings would include that the investment may have
tax consequences in Canada, that investors may have to pursue remedies for securities
law violations against persons and assets located in Canada and that the financial state-
ments are prepared in accordance with Canadian GAAP. Id.
141. Id. at 80,318.
142. Id. at 80,303 n.172. At present, Moody's and Standard and Poor's are the
only rating services that meet the definition of nationally recognized rating service. See
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Form F-9 would rely entirely on Canadian disclosure for such offerings
and Canadian companies that had at least (CN) $180 million market
value for their common stock and at least (CN) $75 million public float
would be eligible to use Form F-9.143 No reconciliation of the financial
statements to United States GAAP would be required when using
Form F-9.""
2. Other Offerings
All other security offerings could be made under proposed Form
F-10 for eligible Canadian issuers.'" Form F-10 would require the
wraparound to include a reconciliation of the financial statements to
United States GAAP as specified by Item 18 of Commission Form 20-
F."'4 Canadian banks and bank holding companies would also have to
include supplemental industry specific information required by Item
III.(C), "Risk Elements" and Item IV., "Summary of Loss Experi-
ence" of Industry Guide 3 under the Securities Act.14 7 Eligible Cana-
dian issuers must have common stock with a market value of at least
(CN) $360 million and public float of at least (CN) $75 million.' 48
B. Periodic Reporting
Issuers that either registered securities under Form F-9" 9 or are
eligible to use that for15 could fulfill their periodic disclosure require-
Letter from Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of
the SEC, at 1 (October 18, 1989) [hereinafter "DBRS Letter"].
143. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,303. "Public float" is defined as the mone-
tary value of all outstanding equity securities owned by non-affiliates. Id. at 80,303
n.173.
144. Id. at 80,298.
145. Id. at 80,303. Included in this category would be debt or preferred stock that
is convertible within one year and common stock.
146. Id. at 80,303. Item 18 of Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1989) requires
full disclosure of all of the information required by regulation S-X and United States
GAAP. See The Release, supra note 1, at 80,303.
147. Id. at 80,304.
148. Id. at 80,303.
149. Under 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (1987) and Regulation 15D 17 C.F.R. §§
240.15d-1 (1982), .15d-2 (1971), .15d-3 (1983), .15d-5 (1983), .15d-6 (1984), .15d-10
(1989), .15d-ll (1985), .15d-13 (1989), .15d-16 (1985), .15d-17 (1971), and .15d-21
(1962) all issuers who register with the SEC become subject to periodic reporting re-
quirements thereafter.
150. Canadian issuers could be subject to United States periodic reporting disclo-
sure requirements if they had previously made offerings in the United States of the
securities covered by proposed Form F-9; or if such a security is listed on a national
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ments by filing their Canadian periodic reporting disclosure documents
with the SEC under proposed Form 40-F.151 As with the original regis-
tration on Form F-9, no reconciliation to United States GAAP would
be required.1 52
Issuers that either registered securities under Form F-10 or are
eligible to use that form1 53 could also fulfill their periodic reporting re-
quirements by filing their Canadian periodic disclosure documents with
the SEC under Form 40-F.5 Such issuers, however, would be required
to include the reconciliation indicated under Item 17 of Form 20-F. 55
C. Tender Offers
Under the system proposed, tender offer filings related to offers for
a class of shares of a Canadian issuer could proceed in the United
States under Canadian law if less than 20 percent of the shares were
held of record by United States residents, the tender offer was extended
to all United States shareholders and the transaction is not subject to
an exemption from substantive Canadian takeover law.'56 Compliance
with Canadian law under the circumstances outlined would suffice for
compliance with the Williams Act, 57 the federal United States tender
offer law.158 State takeover laws' 5 9, however, would not be affected by
the proposed system and, as such, would still have to be complied
with.1 0
Canadian tender offer disclosure documents would be filed under
proposed Form F-8, along with a wraparound including additional SEC
securities exchange in the United States (see 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(b) (1987)); or if such
a security is held of record by more than 500 shareholders, more than 300 of which are
United State residents and certain asset tests are met (see 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g)
(1987), as supplemented by Rules 12g-1 and 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12g-1
(1986) and .12g3-2(b) (1984)).
151. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,309.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 145 to 148 and accompanying text.
154. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,309.
155. Id. Item 17 of Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1989) requires reconcilia-
tion of only the measurement items which are the income statement and the balance
sheet. See The Release, supra note 1, at 80,303 n.177.
156. Id. at 80,305.
157. See supra note 117.
158. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,305.
159. See supra note 118.
160. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,305 n.193. Where state takeover law pro-
hibited extending the offer to shareholders residing in that state, the offeror could ex-
clude such shareholders from the offer. Id.
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mandated disclosure and informational legends.161 Bidders making all
cash tender offers would not have to meet market value and float eligi-
bility requirements. Those making exchange offers1"2 would have to
meet such eligibility tests. 6 '
Finally, the proposed system would offer no relief from the report-
ing obligations imposed by Schedule 13D. 6 1 This occurs whenever any
Canadian entity acquires more than five percent of the target com-
pany's equity securities within a specified period of time.16 5
D. Proxy Solicitation and Rights Offerings
Under the proposed system, Canadian companies soliciting proxies
from United States shareholders need only provide the proxy material
required under Canadian law if the only matters being voted on at the
annual meeting are routine matters such as the election of directors or
ratification of accountants.'" If, however, the matters to be voted on
include nonroutine matters or are such that preliminary proxy materi-
als would be required under United States proxy rules, then such prox-
ies of United States shareholders must be solicited in accordance with
United States proxy rules.'67 Canadian issuers that comply with Cana-
dian shareholder proposal laws will be deemed to have complied with
United States shareholder proposal rules 68 under Rule 14a-8.' 69
Similar to the tender offer rules proposed, certain rights offerings
could be made pursuant to Canadian law under cover of Form F-7.110
No market value or float tests would apply but eligible issuers would be
required to have had the class of securities to which the rights pertain
listed on either the Toronto or Montreal Exchange for the previous 36
months.' 7 '
161. Id. at 80,306.
162. An exchange tender offer is one that offers either all securities or a mixture
of securities and cash for shares of the target company.
163. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,306.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1982).
165. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,306.
166. Id. at 80,308.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1987).
170. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,304.
171. Id.
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VIII. RESPONSES TO THE RELEASE, ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Responses to the Release were overwhelmingly in favor of the
SEC's initiative. Only one response reviewed was entirely opposed to
the whole idea.172 Another unique response favored the proposed sys-
tem but recommended full Item 18 reconciliation to United States
GAAP in all financial statement filings. 173 The rest of the responses
generally either gave opinions on specific questions opened for commen-
tary by the SEC or suggested some refinements to the proposed system.
A. Civil Liability
Several commentators suggested that SEC rules should be
amended to specifically provide Canadian issuers who otherwise fully
comply with the multijurisdictional disclosure requirements a safe har-
bor from civil liability. 7' Such a safe harbor appears to be a vital
prerequisite.
The proposed system would allow certain Canadian issuers to use
Canadian disclosure documents to meet SEC filing requirements. 75
Such filings using Canadian documents would not violate United States
disclosure law. Absent a safe harbor, however, an anti-fraud action
could still be brought alleging that the documents are misleading be-
cause information which normally appears in a United States disclo-
sure document, but not in a Canadian document, has been omitted. 171
This would completely defeat the purpose of the proposed system.1 77
172. Letter from Financial Analysts Federation to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of
the SEC (November 6, 1989). This two page letter stated that Canadian issuers should
be subject to full United States requirements, regardless of the type of securities of-
fered or the nature of the investors. Anything less would be a "significant disservice to
U.S. investors". Id. at 2.
173. Letter from Ernst & Young to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 1
(November 28, 1989) [hereinafter the "Ernst Letter"].
174. Letter from the Toronto Stock Exchange to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of
the SEC, at 6 (October 31, 1989) [hereinafter the "Toronto Letter"]; Letter from the
New York Bar Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 6 (Novem-
ber 29, 1989) [hereinafter the "NY Bar Letter"]; Letter from Northern Telecom Lim-
ited to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 2 (October 30, 1989) [hereinafter
the "NT Letter"]; Letter from Osher, Hoskins & Harcourt to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec-
retary of the SEC, at 3 (November 13, 1989) [hereinafter the "Osher Letter"]; Letter
from Inco Limited to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 4 (October 31, 1989)
[hereinafter the "Inco Letter"]; Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 5.
175. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
176. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,301 n.155.
177. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 5; Inco Letter, supra note 174, at 4.
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Thus, my first recommendation is the creation of such a safe harbor.
B. Securities Offerings and Periodic Reporting
Distinguishing non-convertible investment grade debt and pre-
ferred stock from other securities seems appropriate.' 78 The price of
such securities is almost entirely due to the relationship between the
yield and the risk that the issuer will default. The price of other securi-
ties typically is determined by many additional factors.
Most commentators thought that the same or less stringent eligi-
bility requirements and reconciliations used for offerings should also be
used for periodic reporting.' 79 As a conservative first step and for the
sake of simplicity, the same standards should apply. If this proposed
system functions smoothly, the eligibility and reconciliation require-
ments for periodic reporting companies can be further relaxed at a
later date.
1. Eligibility Requirements
Two commentators suggested that the eligibility requirement of in-
vestment grade as rated by a nationally recognized statistical rating
service be expanded to include not just Canadian issuers so rated by
the United States rating services of Moody's or Standard and Poor's,
but also Canadian issues so rated by comparable Canadian rating ser-
vices. 180 Such a suggestion appears appropriate. Moody's and Standard
and Poor's only rate 32 Canadian issuers that are investment grade
whereas Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited alone rates an addi-
tional 85 Canadian issuers that are investment grade but not rated by
the United States rating services.18 My second recommendation ap-
pears obvious. The definition of nationally recognized rating service
should be expanded to include comparable Canadian rating services.
Five commentators mentioned the non-convertible for one year eli-
gibility requirement for investment grade debt and preferred stock.
Two commentators stated that the one year non-convertible definition
was appropriate and this period need not be extended.' 8' One commen-
178. Only the Ernst Letter, supra note 173, at 2, stated that such a distinction is
inappropriate.
179. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 30 (less stringent standards for periodic
reporting); ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 7 (the same standards for continuous re-
porting purposes).
180. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 11; DBRS Letter, supra note 142, at 1.
181. DBRS Letter, supra note 142, at 1.
182. ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 2; Letter from Bow Valley Industries Ltd. to
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tator suggested that such a period of non-convertibility should be ex-
tended to at least two years.183 Another commentator saw no reason for
treating securities that are convertible after one year as non-convertible
because the commentator has seen very few issues of securities that
become convertible after a specified period of time.1 "
The last commentator on the non-convertible criteria raised an in-
teresting point. While the investment grade debt or preferred stock is
non-convertible, perhaps there are sufficient differences between these
types of securities and other securities to merit different disclosure re-
quirements. 185 The differences, however, disappear as the date for po-
tential conversion, nears.18 6
Imposing the additional disclosure requirements of Form F-10 is-
suers on Form F-9 issuers when the date the securities becomes con-
vertible is sufficiently close so that the convertibility feature has a sig-
nificant enough impact on the price of the securities would be an ideal
solution. This solution would respond to the growing similarities in the
information needs of these investors as the convertibility date ap-
proached. Implementing such a solution, however, would be too unduly
complicated and unwarranted given the small volume of issues of secur-
ities that become convertible after a specified time.
1 87
Until such issues become more common, I do not recommend ad-
justing the proposed system to make special accommodations for such
issues. Rather, only investment grade debt and preferred stock that is
never convertible should be eligible for Form F-9. This approach is
much simpler to implement while it still meets investors' information
needs should these needs change over the life of the securities as the
convertibility feature of the securities changes. Also, this approach
eliminates the need to determine how significant an effect the conver-
sion feature has on the price of the securities. Finally, this approach, if
it errs, does so on the conservative side.
Two commentators felt the market value and public float eligibil-
ity criteria for investment grade debt and preferred stock issuers should
be supplemented with alternative criteria because such tests do not ade-
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 2 (October 30, 1989) [hereinafter the
"Bow Letter"].
183. Letter from the Financial Executives Institute to Jonathan G. Katz, Secre-
tary of the SEC, at Attachment page 1 (November 20, 1989) [hereinafter "FEI
Letter"].
184. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 10-11.
185. See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
186. Ernst Letter, supra note 173, at 4.
187. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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quately reflect the market following of a captive finance subsidiary."' 8
Such issuers would not meet the eligibility criteria even though they
may fit the definition of substantial issuers' 89 that the system was
designed for. I also feel that the criteria defining substantial issuers
should include some additional alternative criteria.
One commentator suggested scraping the market value test and
retaining only the public float eligibility criteria. 190 Another commenta-
tor suggested scraping both the market value and public float tests and
replacing them with a trading volume test.' 9' While I do not recom-
mend scraping either test initially, I do recommend creating some trad-
ing volume test as an alternative criteria for eligibility.
2. Accounting Reconciliations
Whether a reconciliation to United States GAAP should be re-
quired in the wraparound and, if so, whether such reconciliation should
be in conformity with Item 17 (requiring reconciliation of only the
measurement items 92) or Item 18 (requiring full reconciliation to
United States GAAP and all disclosure required by regulation S-X 93 )
of Form 20-F were the two areas most often addressed by the commen-
tators. Only one commentator thought full Item 18 reconciliation
should be required in all circumstances.' 94
Most commentators, however, felt that no reconciliation was nec-
essary for Form F-9 issuers of investment grade debt or preferred stock
and that only Item 17 reconciliation was necessary for Form F-10 issu-
ers of other securities. 95 Some commentators went further to state that
188. Letter from General Motors Acceptance Corporation to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary of the SEC, at 2 (October 26, 1989) [hereinafter the "GMAC Letter"]; NY
Bar Letter, supra note 174, at 2.
189. "Substantial issuers" are defined as those issuers that have a large enough
market following so that the prices of such securities reflect all available public infor-
mation. The Release, supra note 1, at 80,282. A more precise definition of substantial
issuers is those issuers whose size is large enough that the market cperates efficiently
for them. NY Bar Letter, supra note 174, at 2.
190. ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 2-3. As previously discussed, the market
value and public float eligibility criteria apply to both offerings of non-convertible in-
vestment grade debt or preferred stock and other offerings.
191. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 10.
192. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
194. Ernst Letter, supra note 173, at 2-4.
195. FEI Letter, supra note 183, at 1-2; ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 3;
GMAC Letter, supra note 188, at 2; Cohen Letter, supra note 123, at 3; Letter from
NOVA Limited to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 6 (October 30, 1989)
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such Item 17 reconciliation for Form F-10 issuers should not be
mandatory but should only be necessary when there are material differ-
ences between United States GAAP and Canadian GAAP.96 Still
other commentators thought there should be no reconciliation in any
circumstances. 97
Just how significant are the differences between Canadian GAAP
and United States GAAP? The difference between the purchase
method and pooling-of-interests method of accounting for business
combinations only arises in the context of certain types of business
combinations. 98 This difference arises because the former method re-
quires a revaluation of the net assets acquired while the latter does
not.199 This difference, however, only creates a significant difference in
long term assets.
Every dollar of current assets and current liabilities represents ei-
ther an actual dollar of cash or cash equivalents or a claim to receive or
pay a dollar in the near future. Since the fair market value of a dollar
is generally a dollar, regardless of whether that dollar is received now
or in the near future, current assets and current liabilities are generally
stated at values that very closely approximate fair market value. Thus,
using one or the other business combination accounting method has vir-
tually no effect on current assets or current liabilities.
The differences in pension accounting"' and income tax account-
ing 20 1 have their primary effect on the footnotes of the financial state-
ments and on long term liabilities or long term assets. However, the
footnotes generally explain how the pension account numbers and the
income tax account numbers were derived.
As far as comparability of financial statements is concerned, since
Canadian GAAP requires a method of accounting for income taxes
that was previously required in the United States, Canadian GAAP
financial statements are just as comparable to current United States
[hereinafter the "NOVA Letter"]; NY Bar Letter, supra note 174, at 7.
196. Inco Letter, supra note 174, at 5; Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 3; NT
Letter, supra note 174, at 2.
197. Osher Letter, supra note 174, at 2 (however, Item 17 of Form 20-F, 17
C.F.R. § 249.220f (1989) suffices if some reconciliation required); Letter from Norcen
Energy Resources Limited to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 1-2 (Novem-
ber 3, 1989) [hereinafter the "Norcen Letter"]; Letter from Placer Dome, Inc. to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC, at 1 (October 27, 1989) [hereinafter the "PD
Letter"]; Bow Letter, supra note 182, at 2.
198. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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GAAP financial statements as United States GAAP financial state-
ments from several years ago are. Pension accounting in the United
States seems to change every couple of years. Thus, pension accounting
is inherently inconsistent and attempting to obtain comparability is a
meaningless waste.
The differences in reporting earnings per share data 2 ' and ex-
traordinary items20 3 can produce significant differences in the amount
of information available to investors in equity securities. Earnings per
share data are a primary and frequently relied upon means for inves-
tors to make quick evaluations of equity investments. As such, this in-
formation is very valuable to an investor.
The rest of the general differences in the GAAP of the United
States and Canada are either fairly insignificant or are merely a ques-
tion of timing differences which are also fairly insignificant when finan-
cial statements are evaluated over an extended period of time. No pru-
dent investor makes an investment decision based on financial
statements covering only one year. Indeed, both Canadian disclosure
regulations and United States disclosure regulations require financial
statements for period of time that is generally long enough so that tim-
ing differences are fairly insignificant.
The primary factors necessary to decide whether or not to invest in
an investment grade debt or preferred stock issue are the yield and the
risk. The yield on such securities is determined by only two factors and
is the quotient of the fixed return divided by the price. Both of these
factors are readily determinable without any reconciliation.
The risk represents the possibility that the issuer cannot pay inter-
est or preferred dividend payments on a regular basis. A strong work-
ing capital position20 4 and strong cash flows indicate low risk. Since
working capital is generally unaffected by the differences in GAAP, a
reconciliation would not provide any useful information on working
capital. Also, none of the differences have any direct effect on cash
flow. 105 Finally, the investment grade rating is an alternative evaluation
202. See supra note I10-111 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
204. Working capital equals current assets less current liabilities.
205. However, there may be some indirect effects due to the timing of when taxa-
ble income is recognized. For example, assuming an item where income tax laws fol-
lowed GAAP, if U.S. GAAP required expending the item immediately while Canadian
GAAP required capitalization and amortization of the item, U.S. GAAP would pro-
duce lower current taxable income and lower current income taxes. Hence, current
cash flow would be greater under U.S. GAAP. However, this advantage is short lived
because taxable income and income taxes would be lower in future years under Cana-
dian GAAP and, hence, future cash flow would be greater under Canadian GAAP.
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of the risk involved. Thus, reconciliation of financial statements for
Form F-9 issuers of investment grade debt or preferred stock is not
justified and should not be required.
Other types of investments are evaluated based on many addi-
tional factors. Comparability of earnings per share data certainly pro-
vides valuable information to the common stock investor or to other
Form F-10 issuance investors. An Item 17 reconciliation, however, is
sufficient to provide such comparable earnings per share data and much
additional comparable information.
Item 18 reconciliation, while it does provide even more informa-
tion, does not seem necessary. Requiring Item 18 reconciliation would
defeat the purpose of the multijurisdictional system because such rec-
onciliation would not significantly simplify multijurisdictional disclo-
sure over present methods. 2°8 Also, just because there are some differ-
ences between Canadian GAAP and US GAAP, it does not follow that
disclosure documents prepared in accordance with Canadian standards
cannot meet the SEC's sufficient disclosure goal.
The SEC does not require disclosure of everything. Only disclosure
of material matters is required. The SEC has defined "material" as
describing those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether
to purchase the security registered.2"7 Thus, disclosure documents pre-
pared according to Canadian standards, although differing from those
prepared according to US standards, can still meet the SEC's disclo-
sure goal as long as the material matters are disclosed. Since Canadian
securities regulation has a similar disclosure goal208 , the material mat-
ters are disclosed in documents prepared in accordance with Canadian
standards.
One commentator even remarked that no one other than the SEC
has ever expressed any interest in its reconciliation disclosure.20 9 Just
because investors do not question such reconciliations, however, it does
not follow that such reconciliations do not provide helpful information
with which a reasonable investor is substantially likely to form the ba-
sis for an informed investment decision. Thus, Item 17, but not Item
18, reconciliation should be required for Form F-10 issuers.
Again, when the risk is evaluated over multiple years, these differences become
insignificant.
206. Cohen Letter, supra note 123, at 3.
207. Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1985).
208. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
209. PD Letter, supra note 197, at 1.
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C. Tender Offers
One commentator noted that the implementation of the proposed
multijurisdictional system does not eliminate the need to continue at-
tempts to harmonize the standards in both countries. 21 0 This is espe-
cially true in the area of tender offers. 21' The real problem occurs when
two bidders vying for the same target have their bids governed by dif-
ferent sets of regulations." 2
Two commentators noted how this could occur.21 '3 An initial Cana-
dian bidder could commence a tender offer for a target company that
had less than 20 percent of its shares held of record by United States
shareholders.21 ' The initial bidder thus could make its bid pursuant to
Canadian tender offer law and still be in compliance with the Williams
Act.215 By the time a rival United States bidder commenced a compet-
ing tender offer, a sufficient number of shareholders could have sold
their shares to one of the large United States arbitrageurs, so that
United States shareholders would then represent over 20 percent of the
shareholders. 26 The second bidder would thus have to comply with the
Williams Act.21 7
This would create a bifurcated bidding process. 218 The first bidder,
pursuant to Canadian law, could purchase an additional five percent of
the shares of the target company while the tender offers were still
open.219 However, the second bidder, pursuant to United States law,
would be precluded from doing the same.220
Such an anomaly must be addressed by the proposed system.
Somehow, the competing bidder should be subject to the same rules as
the initial bidder.22' Perhaps this could be accomplished by determin-
ing the percentage of United States shareholders (and thus the applica-
ble set of rules) for the second bidder retroactively to the date the ini-
210. Letter from the American Stock Exchange to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
of the SEC, at 7 (November 20, 1989).
211. Cohen Letter, supra note 123, at 2; Toronto Letter, supra note 174, at 4.
212. Toronto Letter, supra note 174, at 4.
213. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 23-24; ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 6.
214. ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 6.
215. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
216. ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 6.
217. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
218. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 24.
219. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
220. Id.
221. ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 6.
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tial bidder commenced its bid. 2
Only one commentator disagreed with the 20 percent threshold 2
for tender offers, stating that the threshold should be 49 percent.22 The
other commentators mentioning this threshold thought 20 percent was
appropriate.2 5 I agree with the latter group. Acquisition of 20 percent
of the stock of the target company is the minimum threshold necessary
to constitute a tender offer under Canadian law.228
D. Shelf Registration
Currently, shelf registration is possible under SEC Rule 415227
and under rules promulgated by the CVMQ in Quebec. 2 8 However,
the OSC has no similar process in Ontario. This could result in very
few offerings of shelf registration eligible securities in Ontario, a disad-
vantage to Ontario investors and Ontario issuers. The adoption by the
OSC of a similar shelf registration process would eliminate this disad-
vantage, and is recommended. 29
E. Expected Cost Savings
Over the years, Canadian issuers have been deterred from issuing
securities in the United States because of the perceived excessive cost
and practical difficulty in complying with United States disclosure and
reporting requirements.2 3 0 The proposed multijurisdictional system
should help remove the unnecessary impediments to such issuers.2 31
Two commentators expected to realize cost savings due to the reduced
compliance burden on the periodic reporting.2 32 Another commentator
expected to save substantial legal and printing costs. 2 33 Finally, one
commentator expected to save up to two-thirds of its rights offerings
expenses incurred, exclusive of underwriting fees, because 15 to 20 per-
222. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 25.
223. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
224. ABA Letter, supra note 123, at 5.
225. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 22; PD Letter, supra note 197, at 2.
226. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 22.
227. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1983).
228. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
229. NT Letter, supra note 174, at 3; Osher Letter, supra note 174, at 7.
230. Sullivan Letter, supra note 73, at 2.
231. Letter from Shearson Lehman Hutton to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the
SEC, at 1 (October 24, 1989).
232. Inco Letter, supra note 174, at 2; NT Letter, supra note 174, at 6.
233. Norcen Letter, supra note 197, at 3.
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cent of its shareholders are United States residents.23 '
IX. CONCLUSION
The globalization of the world's capital markets is no longer a pre-
diction about the future, it is today's reality. The SEC, OSC and
CVMQ must respond to this. The Release is a major step in the right
direction. This comment has analyzed some of the major aspects of the
proposed multijurisdictional system and has pointed out some of the
system's shortcomings. These shortcomings can be overcome, however.
Through further cooperative efforts by the SEC, 3' OSC, CVMQ and
other regulatory bodies, the obstacles standing in the way of an effec-
tive multijurisdictional disclosure system can be removed and the goals
of security regulation can be met.
Alan Goggins
234. NOVA Letter, supra note 195, at 8-9.
235. The SEC is setting up an International Affairs Office to improve cooperative
efforts with securities regulators abroad. Cooperative agreements have recently been
reached with France and the Netherlands to improve information flow and curb insider
trading and other market abuses. USA Today, Dec. 19, 1989 at 1, col. 1.
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